



2023

# SEEING DOUBLE

DECODING THE  
'ADDITIONALITY' OF  
CLIMATE FINANCE



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
*Cover photo on the left by John Hewat (Cambodia 2019); on the right by John Rutherford Michel (Haiti 2020).*

*The study was commissioned by CARE Denmark.*

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



In 2009 developed countries committed to supporting climate change adaptation and mitigation activities in developing countries. It was agreed that they would provide scaled-up, new and additional finance, reaching USD 100 billion a year in 2020.

In 2020 and following years, wealthy countries have repeatedly missed this target, but as we document in this research, they also failed to ensure that climate finance was “new and additional” to their support for development.

Because there is no formal definition of “new and additional” support, this analysis utilises two definitions:


- **Strong additionality:** The amount of climate finance which has been provided on top of the long-standing international commitment made by wealthy countries to provide 0.7 per cent of their GNI as official development assistance (ODA).
- **Weak additionality:** The amount of climate finance which has been provided by a wealthy country on top of the level of development finance they contributed in 2009, the year of the COP15 climate finance commitment.

By assessing the most up-to-date data reported to the UNFCCC, only 7 per cent of the climate finance provided from 2011 to 2020 is found to be new and additional to wealthy countries’ ODA commitments.

Even under the weak definition of additionality, 52 per cent of the global North’s public climate finance is development finance being diverted towards climate change action.

As a result, most of the public climate finance reported by wealthy countries is taken directly from development aid budgets. This means less support for health, education, women’s rights, poverty alleviation, and progress towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals.

The physical realities of climate change will add substantial costs to the development agendas in global South countries. Diverting funds from tackling poverty to support the response to climate change is unjust and attributes the responsibility for action to the world’s poorest, who have contributed least to the crisis.



## **LACK OF ADDITIONAL CLIMATE FUNDS THREATENS SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS**

In 2015, the UN General Assembly set an agenda to secure sustainable development across the world by 2030. The agenda requires that 17 Sustainable Development Goals are met, including the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger as well as achieving gender equality and empowerment of all women and girls.

The finance required for SDG investments is vast and needed urgently. For many developing countries, external public resources, such as official development assistance (ODA), remain essential. It is therefore important that wealthy countries meet their commitments to provide 0.7 percent of GNI in ODA, but the developed countries in the OECD currently provide only around half of this amount.

As documented in this report, the majority of climate finance reported by wealthy countries means less finance for broader development priorities which threatens the achievement of the SDGs. This in turn undermines resilience to climate change, as noted by the IPCC:

“A key agreement was that climate financing should be ‘new and additional’ and not at the cost of SDGs. Resources prioritising climate at the cost of non-climate development finance increases the vulnerability of a population for any given level of climate shocks, and additionality of climate financing is thus essential.” (IPCC, 2022).

2009's climate finance commitment was not an altruistic pledge by wealthy countries. It was a component of a broader global green deal which pledged climate finance to support countries in the global South in stepping up climate action as part of their sustainable development and poverty reduction efforts. The global North had failed to cut its own emissions fast enough to bring climate change under control, and global warming had reached a level that necessitated costly adaptation to climate change. It was therefore considered fair that wealthy countries would pick up at least some of the bill for climate action in the global South.

However, wealthy countries failed to comply with their side of the deal. And while vulnerable countries in the global South began the process of climate-proofing their futures, the finance promised to assist them in doing so has never fully materialised. The Glasgow Climate Pact agreed during the UNFCCC's COP26 negotiations noted "with deep regret that the goal of developed country Parties to mobilize jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020" had "not yet been met".

Furthermore, wealthy countries over-report how much climate finance they deliver and have failed to ensure a balance between the finance they provide for climate change mitigation and adaptation objectives, issues which have been laid out in numerous reports from academics, the OECD, the UNFCCC, and civil society alike (Timmons Roberts and Weikmans, 2017; OECD, 2021a; Bhattacharya et al., 2020; Zagma et al., 2023; CARE, 2021a).


In this report, we look at another crucial aspect of climate finance. We investigate whether the public climate finance reported by the 23 wealthy countries with obligations under the UNFCCC is new and additional to their support for development.

Our analysis includes all the public climate finance reported by these countries from 2011 to 2020. The analysis therefore covers the most recent, comprehensive and official data available.

As stated, we use and compare two definitions of additionality to outline what counts as "new and additional" climate finance:

- 1 Strong additionality: The amount of climate finance which has been provided on top of the long-standing international commitment made by wealthy countries to provide 0.7 per cent of their GNI as official development assistance (ODA).
- 2 Weak additionality: The amount of climate finance which has been provided by a wealthy country on top of the level of development finance they contributed in 2009, the year of the COP15 climate finance commitment.

In total, wealthy countries reported USD 295 billion of public climate finance across the ten years from 2011 to 2020, as outlined in **Figure 1**. Yet we find just USD 20 billion of that climate finance to be strongly additional. Meaning only 7 per cent of wealthy countries' climate finance has been



**Figure 1:** Climate finance reported by Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020 and amounts which can be considered "new and additional" (USD billions).

provided on top of the commitment to provide 0.7 per cent of their GNI towards development in the global South.

Considering the second assessed definition, USD 141 billion, or 48 per cent, of reported climate finance was found to be weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance observed in 2009. Even under this weaker definition of additionality more than half of the climate finance reported by wealthy countries does not represent extra support for the global South. Instead, this support is development finance being ‘rebadged’ with climate change objectives when it should have been provided on top of any support for development.

In 2011, the share of reported climate finance found to be weakly additional was 60 per cent, while the share of reported figures found to be strongly additional was 10 per cent. By 2019 these shares had dropped to 46 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively. While overall amounts of both development finance and new and additional climate finance increased in 2020, driven by support responding to the pandemic among other factors, wealthy countries continue to report more climate finance than can feasibly be considered as new and additional support.

Despite the rhetoric surrounding the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals and the focus on ending poverty and hunger by 2030, too little effort is being made to contribute climate finance on top of existing development finance obligations.

**We have analysed the climate finance reported by each of the 23 wealthy countries and our analysis shows that they fall into 3 broad groups:**

***Countries providing significant amounts of strongly additional climate finance: The 1% club***

Only 3 countries, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden, have consistently surpassed the commitment to provide 0.7 per cent of their GNI as ODA. At the same time, these countries have provided large per capita amounts of both strongly and weakly additional climate finance on top of their support for development.

Across the ten-year period, these countries provided just over 1 per cent of their GNI as ODA towards development and climate change objectives.

***Countries providing some strongly and weakly additional climate finance***

A further 11 countries, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Iceland, Austria, Japan, New Zealand, Canada and Italy provided much lower shares of their GNI as ODA compared to Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden. As a result, these countries provided low, or no, amounts of strongly additional finance.

Denmark and the Netherlands saw years where all or some of their climate finance came on top of the 0.7 per cent target. Yet, for both countries, amounts of new and additional climate finance and overall development support significantly reduced over the period.

The only other members of this group to provide strongly additional climate finance were Germany and the United Kingdom. Germany’s development support as a share of GNI has increased over the period from 0.39% in 2011 to 0.75% in 2020, meaning Germany had provided a portion of its climate finance as strongly additional support in 2020. The United Kingdom provided a marginal amount of strongly additional support on top of their 0.7 pledge from 2011-2020.

In terms of weakly additional finance, Germany provided 85% of its climate finance above the level of development support the country provided in 2009. The United Kingdom consistently increased the amounts of development finance it contributed from 2011 to 2020 in absolute terms, relative to 2009. This meant that all the United Kingdom’s reported climate finance between 2011 and 2020 met CARE’s definition of weak additionality.

The UK did, however, cut its ODA spend to 0.5% of GNI from 2021 (UK Parliament, 2020), and has chosen to count other expenditure, such as in donor country refugee costs, towards this reduced budget. These decisions have greatly reduced the UK Government’s spending on international development since 2020 and potential to meet climate finance commitments.

Switzerland consistently provided around 0.5 per cent of its GNI as ODA across the period, yet failed to exceed the target in any year, failing to provide any strongly additional climate finance. As was the case with the United Kingdom, all of Switzerland’s climate finance met the weak definition of additionality.

Iceland, Austria, Japan, New Zealand, Canada and Italy

make up the remainder of this group. These countries failed to provide any strongly additional climate finance and provided much less weakly additional finance on a per capita basis.

**Countries providing no strongly additional finance, and small amounts of weakly additional finance**

The final 9 countries, Australia, Finland, France, the United States, Spain, Belgium, Portugal Greece and Ireland, failed to surpass the 0.7 per cent target in any of the 10 years, and provided no strongly additional climate finance. These countries provided less than USD 10 annually per capita of weakly additional climate finance to the global South from 2011 to 2020.

New and additional climate finance (Per capita annual average; 2011-2020; USD)		
Country	Strongly additional: Additional to 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA	Weakly additional: Additional to the level of development finance in 2009
Luxembourg	\$170	\$121
Norway	\$143	\$98
Sweden	\$63	\$59
Denmark	\$30	\$8
Netherlands	\$5	\$0
Germany	\$2	\$65
United Kingdom	\$1	\$30
Switzerland	\$0	\$36
Iceland	\$0	\$28
Austria	\$0	\$15
Japan	\$0	\$12
New Zealand	\$0	\$10
Canada	\$0	\$10
Italy	\$0	\$10
Australia	\$0	\$9
Finland	\$0	\$8
France	\$0	\$7
United States	\$0	\$6
Spain	\$0	\$1
Belgium	\$0	\$1
Portugal	\$0	\$1
Greece	\$0	\$0
Ireland	\$0	\$0
<b>Annex II Parties</b>	<b>\$2</b>	<b>\$15</b>

**Table 1:** The relative efforts of Annex II Parties to provide new and additional climate finance in the context of two definitions of additionality: (1) Funds in excess of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA; and (2) Funds in excess of the level of development finance in 2009 (USD; 2011-2020; Per capita annual averages). Ordering presents the countries providing finance above 0.7% of GNI first, and then those providing climate finance above the levels of development finance observed in 2009.

Most striking are the low amounts of both reported and additional climate finance being contributed by the United States – historically the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The United States accounted for 25 per cent of global GNI in 2020 and is the largest economy in the World (World Bank, 2023). Despite this, the United States reported just 0.01 per cent of its GNI as climate finance from 2011 to 2020, some of which was not additional to the country’s support for development.

Analyses show that regardless of the metric and methodology used to determine a wealthy country’s fair share of international efforts to contribute climate finance to the global South, the United States remains well short of shouldering its responsibility (Colenbrander, Cao, & Pettinotti, 2021; Egli & Stunzi, 2019).



# RECOMMENDATIONS

**CARE calls on the G7 and other Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC to begin to honour their obligations and commitments to provide USD 100 billion of new and additional climate finance. Wealthy countries should follow the example of Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden by delivering all of their climate finance on top of the pledge to provide 0.7 per cent of their GNI as ODA.**

**Countries not yet meeting the 0.7 per cent target should redouble their efforts to do so within the next few years, and make sure that their climate finance is contributed on top of a growing aid budget.**

**In the on-going climate finance negotiations under the UNFCCC, and specifically the current discussions on a New Collective Quantified Goal on climate finance (NCQG) to be set in 2024, a clear definition of what constitutes “new and additional” climate finance should be agreed. This definition should ensure that climate finance is additional to any support provided for “loss and damage” and development. It is in the interest of all Parties to know either exactly what they can expect to receive or what they are expected to provide.**

**Development and climate activities require substantially increased funding. Despite the falling costs of mitigation technologies, and the many synergies between mitigation and adaptation actions and sustainable development, it is imperative that wealthy countries’ contributions of climate finance come on top of their support for development, complementing developing countries own efforts and investments.**

**Governments must take next steps to explore new and innovative sources of grant-based finance (climate damages tax on the fossil fuel industry; the redirection of fossil fuel subsidies; international levies on commercial air passenger travel and emissions from international shipping; debt cancellation and debt relief mechanism for countries hit by extreme climate events) that can generate new and additional resources for climate finance.**





# INTRODUCTION

In 2009's Copenhagen Accord, developed countries committed to providing financial support to address the needs of developing countries to respond to climate change. In doing so, developed country Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) promised to mobilise \$100 billion a year in climate finance for developing countries by 2020, a pledge reaffirmed by Article 9 of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015).

Despite the historic responsibility for cumulative global emissions residing squarely with the wealthy, industrialised countries of the global North, the impacts of climate change are hitting the poorest and most vulnerable hardest. Climate shocks are compounding global inequalities, exacerbating existing development challenges, and adding a substantial burden to public budgets in the global South. As an exercise recognising historic responsibility and building trust, provisions of climate finance to cover the full costs of climate change are considered central to the grand bargain of multilateralism under the Paris Agreement (Bhattacharya et al., 2020).

Key decisions surrounding the \$100 billion goal made clear that finance had to be contributed on top of existing efforts to support development in the global South: that finance must be “new and additional”. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord stated “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding” needed to be provided from wealthy to poor countries to implement the Convention. Additionality as a precondition for climate finance recognised that if resources were to be diverted from tackling inequality to tackling the climate emergency, a population's vulnerability to climate shocks would likely increase.

Over the last decade, organisations have tracked progress towards the joint mobilisation goal, often landing at different estimates. Estimates of the total amount of public climate finance provided by developed to developing countries in 2020 vary from \$68.3 to \$21-24.5 billion in reports from the OECD and Oxfam, respectively (OECD, 2022; Zagma et al.,

2023). These differences reflect divergent views concerning what exactly counts as climate finance. The OECD largely aggregate the finance reported by, and attributable to, wealthy countries, regardless of whether that finance is provided as a grant or a market-rate loan. Oxfam, on the other hand, attempts to include only the most equitable finance, accounting for inaccurate reporting on the part of wealthy countries and the loan-based finance which will eventually make its way back to the global North. These analyses do not assess how much reported climate finance can be considered as new and additional to development support.

Efforts to ensure finance is new and additional have been lacking over the last decade and concerns surrounding additionality remain (IPCC, 2022). In a 2022 report, CARE assessed how much of the public climate finance reported by wealthy countries in the global North - the 23 Annex II Parties of the UNFCCC - had been new and additional to their support for development from 2011-2018. The analysis found that of the \$220 billion of reported public climate finance, just \$14 billion, or 6%, had been provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA annually, while just 45% of reported funds were provided in excess of the level of development finance contributed in 2009 (CARE, 2022).

This report builds on CARE's previous analysis and assesses the additionality of the most up-to-date climate finance figures officially reported to the UNFCCC by wealthy countries. In doing so, we analyse the impact of two definitions of additionality on the amounts of climate finance reportedly being contributed to the global South from 2011-2020.

# THE ORIGINS OF “NEW AND ADDITIONAL”

Broadly, additionality can be defined as “the need for climate finance to be added on top of existing development aid flows and ensure that development finance does not decline as climate finance increases” (Bhattacharya et al., 2020).

The roots of additionality can be traced back over three decades to 1989. The UN General Assembly, considering the then-upcoming UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), decided to identify “ways and means of providing new and additional financial resources, particularly to developing countries, for environmentally sound development” (UN, 1990). The subsequent Agenda 21 text resulting from the UNCED meet in Rio de Janeiro, 1992, asserted that “[developmental and environmental objectives] will require a substantial flow of new and additional financial resources to developing countries, in order to cover the incremental costs for the actions they have to undertake to deal with global environmental problems and to accelerate sustainable development” (UNSD, 1992).

In the explicit context of climate change, the concept of “new and additional” finance appeared as foundational to the UNFCCC itself. Under Article 4.3, the Convention states that financial resources to meet the full incremental costs of climate actions should be “new and additional” (UN, 1992).

In both Agenda 21 and the UNFCCC, there was an explicit understanding that climate change and environmental problems represented further burdens for developing countries, and that they would need extra support to overcome them.

Moving forward, additionality as a precondition for climate finance was consistently reiterated during the establishment of the \$100 billion goal. The Copenhagen Accord of 2009 stated that “scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2010). The Cancun Agreement then formalised the pledges

made in Copenhagen, deciding “scaled-up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding shall be provided to developing country Parties, taking into account the urgent and immediate needs of developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” (UNFCCC, 2011). And while the phrase “new and additional” does not appear in the text of the Paris Agreement, it was mentioned in the subsequent Katowice Rulebook (UNFCCC, 2016a, 2018a).

Despite constant reference, progress towards an internationally agreed definition of “new and additional” climate finance failed to materialise. The Standing Committee on Finance’s Biennial Assessment reports moved to review the literature, suggesting eight possible definitions of additionality. However, none were universally adopted, and additionality remains undefined under the UNFCCC architecture to this day. Most wealthy countries make use of hollow definitions, allowing them to report all their finance as new and additional (CARE, 2023).



# METHODOLOGY

To assess the additionality of wealthy countries' climate finance, CARE has selected two definitions of the "new and additional" concept cited in the UNFCCC's Biennial Assessment reports (UNFCCC, 2014; 2016). Efforts to provide climate finance have then been tracked and compared against wider trends in public development finance and existing development obligations, as published by the OECD. As a result, we analyse the extent to which climate finance can be considered as additional to support for development.

## TWO APPROACHES TO ASSESS ADDITIONALITY

Two definitions of additionality are explored in the analysis, and outlined in detail below:

- 1 Strong additionality:** The amount of climate finance which has been provided on top of the long-standing international commitment made by wealthy countries to provide 0.7% of their GNI as Official Development Assistance (ODA).
- 2 Weak additionality:** The amount of climate finance which has been provided by wealthy countries on top of the level of development finance they contributed in 2009, the year of the COP15 climate finance commitment.

### Strong additionality: New and additional funds in excess of 0.7% of GNI

Strongly additional climate finance is the finance provided by wealthy countries on top of a commitment to provide 0.7% of their GNI as ODA annually. This is because many of the costs of climate change come on top of those for development, and because support for development should not decline as a result of increased support for climate change. Only funds in excess of this existing pledge to



support development in the global South can be considered as new and additional here.

In 1970, developed countries committed to providing 0.7% of their GNI as ODA annually (UN General Assembly, 1970). The pledge has been repeatedly endorsed at the highest level at international development conferences. All OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members accept the target, apart from Switzerland and the US (OECD, n.d b).

At the G8 meeting at Gleneagles in 2005, wealthy nations repeated their promise to increase financial assistance to developing countries, and to finally reach the 0.7% target. In the same year, the EU, G8 and UN World Summit all referenced the commitment (*ibid.*). These commitments were reaffirmed through the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development in 2015 (UNDESA, 2015).

Unfortunately, neither the G7, Russia, nor the EU has realised these promises. In 2021 and 2022, EU Member States contributed 0.49% and 0.57% of their GNI as ODA, while developed countries provided just 0.33% and 0.36% collectively (OECD, 2022a; 2023). In 2022, only four countries, Germany, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden, met or exceeded the 0.7% target, while the United States contributed 0.22% of its GNI as ODA (OECD, 2023). Regardless of concerns surrounding the over-reporting of loan-based ODA and ODA in support of COVID-related activities and in-country refugee costs (Cutts, 2022; Dissanayake, 2022), after

50 years, wealthy countries are still far from achieving the 0.7% target.

It is therefore important to determine how much climate finance has been contributed by wealthy countries on top of their 0.7% pledge. Doing so will highlight the extent to which climate finance is additional to development support, rather than simply ODA rebadged with climate objectives.


CARE has collected OECD data concerning ODA and GNI for each wealthy country (OECD, n.d a; n.d c). These data allow for annual climate finance totals to be compared against annual provisions of ODA - both as shares of GNI. Only climate finance provided in excess of an annual 0.7% GNI baseline can be considered as new and additional support, as presented in **Figure 2**.

This definition of new and additional climate finance creates a hard distinction between the financial efforts in support of development and climate objectives, respectively. Of the two selected definitions, this GNI-ODA metric best accounts for the reality of climate change in the global South: where many of the costs of climate change have added to the costs of development.

Importantly, for climate finance to be considered as strongly additional it must also qualify as ODA, i.e. as “concessional”

finance being provided on terms more favourable to countries in the global South than other forms of development support.<sup>1</sup> Strongly additional climate finance recognises the common but differentiated responsibilities of Parties under the UNFCCC, and the obligation of the global North to shoulder the full costs of climate change by contributing primarily grant-based and concessional support.

<sup>1</sup> Luxembourg reports climate finance as both ODA and International Climate Finance (ICF). ICF is reported to the UNFCCC as non-concessional OOF to distinguish it from climate-related ODA. However, OECD records show that Luxembourg did not provide any OOF to developing countries between 2011-2020. Luxembourg’s ICF is therefore treated as “new and additional” finance in this analysis



**Figure 2:** Schematic outlining the climate finance qualifying as new and additional under the definition: Funds in excess of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA.

## Weak additionality: New and additional funds in excess of development finance provided in 2009

Weakly additional climate finance represents the finance provided by wealthy countries on top of the level of development finance they contributed in 2009. To be providing weakly additional climate finance, an Annex II Party must contribute more development finance in a given year, relative to 2009, before any of that country's climate finance can be deemed as new and additional.

Because the Copenhagen Accord was agreed upon at the end of 2009, development finance disbursed in that year forms a logical baseline to describe the level of financial effort invested into development obligations before the agreement of the \$100 billion goal (Mitchell, Ritchie and Tahmasebi, 2021).


The climate finance reported by wealthy countries to the UNFCCC is therefore placed within the broader context of trends in development finance over time. An increase in a

country's contribution of development finance, relative to 2009, sets the upper bound for new and additional support, as indicated in **Figure 3**, below. If a Party's annual provision of development finance has stayed level or decreased relative to 2009, no climate finance can be considered as additional.

This definition of additionality counts contributions of climate finance reported as both concessional ODA and "non-concessional" finance reported as Other Official Flows (OOF). While concessional finance must follow strict rules dictating how favourable the finance is for the recipient, non-concessional finance does not and can be extended with conditions closer to those seen on private markets.<sup>2</sup>

Many argue that OOF should not be considered a legitimate

<sup>2</sup> In effect, concessional development finance describes the degree to which a wealthy country's returns are reduced when providing development finance, as compared to returns which would be expected if the same finance was provided at full market rates. ODA is highly concessional development finance: alongside grants, ODA loans and other non-grant financial instruments result in smaller returns for the provider. On the other hand, OOF is non-concessional, resulting in larger returns for the provider.



**Figure 3:** Schematic outlining the climate finance qualifying as new and additional under the definition: Funds above a baseline of development finance (ODA and OOF, respectively) in 2009.

source of climate finance, due to the less favourable terms with which it is provided, often using loans (Zagama et al., 2023). These conditions add further burden to public budgets in the global South and cause substantial debt. Despite these concerns, climate finance provided towards the \$100 billion goal can be reported as both concessional and non-concessional finance.

To assess this definition, CARE collected OECD data concerning each Party's total provision of ODA and OOF through both bilateral and multilateral channels, to compare it to the climate finance they reported to the UNFCCC as ODA and OOF in a given year (OECD, n.d a). The annual climate finance reported by wealthy countries as ODA and OOF is treated as two separate flows when comparing them to total ODA and OOF flows. These flows are then combined to present a total figure for additional climate finance.

Because both ODA and OOF are considered, the amount of climate finance provided in excess of the levels of development finance contributed in 2009 can be considered a very liberal definition of additionality (Brown, Bird and Schalatek, 2010; Stadelmann, Timmons Roberts and Michaelowa, 2011). It is therefore referred to here as “weak additionality”.


## OUR DATA AND CALCULATIONS

To analyse the additionality of reported climate finance CARE has compiled wealthy countries' first, second, third, fourth and fifth biennial reports (BRs) to the UNFCCC using the Biennial Reports Data Interface (BR-DI) (UNFCCC, n.d). These reports allow for an analysis of the public climate finance reported from 2011 to 2020 and represent all the data officially reported to the UNFCCC to date (climate finance totals for 2010 were not reported to the UNFCCC).

To help capture the full financial efforts made by wealthy countries to contribute climate finance to the global South, CARE has ensured that two additional ‘flows’ of climate finance have been consistently included in our totals. Firstly, our figures ensure that annual totals include the climate-relevant portion of core financial contributions to multilateral organisations, where these were not included by the wealthy country themselves. Secondly, the climate finance contributed by the European Union has been distributed between the EU Member States using their

respective contributions to the EU budget (European Commission, n.d).

By including the climate finance resulting from core contributions to multilateral organisations and the EU in our figures, we can assess the additionality of all the public climate finance which is attributable to wealthy countries. Further detail regarding our data and calculations can be found in Annex A.



# FINDINGS: HOW MUCH CLIMATE FINANCE IS NEW AND ADDITIONAL?

CARE estimates that \$295 billion of public climate finance was contributed by wealthy countries to the global South from 2011 to 2020.

After assessing these contributions, we find that \$20 billion was strongly additional and provided on top of the 0.7% of GNI pledged towards ODA budgets. \$141 billion was found to be weakly additional and provided in excess of the levels of development finance wealthy countries provided in 2009. In the context of these respective definitions, just 7% and 48% of the public climate finance reported by wealthy countries is found to be “new and additional”.



**Figure 4:** Aggregated climate finance reported by Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020, and amounts which can be considered “new and additional” (USD billions)


Below, **Figure 5** presents an annual breakdown of the climate finance reported collectively to the UNFCCC by the 23 wealthy countries, and the amounts which can be considered “new and additional”.

Although not rising quickly enough to meet their commitments, and without any accounting for overreported climate finance, the climate finance reported to the UNFCCC by wealthy countries is seen to increase over the period, in agreement with existing analysis (Zagama et al., 2023; Carty, Kowalzig and Zagema, 2021; OECD, 2020; Bos and Thwaites, 2021). However, little increase in reported climate finance can be seen from 2018-2020.

Under both definitions of additionality, the proportion of the climate finance reported to the UNFCCC which was found to be new and additional to support for development decreased from 2011-2019, and then rose in 2020.

In 2011, the proportion of reported climate finance found to be in excess of the level of development finance in 2009 was 60%, while the share of reported figures which were provided on top of 0.7% of GNI contributed as ODA was 10%. In 2019 these shares dropped to 46% and 5%, respectively, rising to 65% and 11% in 2020 - the highest shares across the ten-year period. This means that from 2011-2019 an increasing share of wealthy countries’ development finance was being reported with climate objectives, and less effort was being made to contribute climate finance on top of existing development obligations. While this trend was reversed in 2020, wealthy countries continue to report more climate finance than can feasibly be considered as new and additional support.

Despite reported climate finance totals increasing only marginally in 2020, amounts of new and additional finance increased more significantly. In 2020, wealthy countries’ total provision of development support increased substantially,



**Figure 5:** Annual climate finance reported collectively by Annex II Parties from 2011 to 2020, and amounts that can be considered “new and additional” (USD billions)

with OECD estimates stating that total ODA rose by 3.5% in real terms, relative to 2019, to its highest recorded level (OECD, 2021b). This increase was primarily driven by support mobilised in response to the pandemic, with COVID-related ODA comprising around 7% of total ODA in 2020 (ibid.). These increases in financial support mean that wealthy countries have provided more development finance, both as a share of GNI and relative to 2009, than in previous years. In turn, the amounts of both strongly and weakly additional climate

finance are seen to increase in 2020.

To highlight the relative effort of each wealthy country to provide new and additional climate finance, **Table 3** presents per capita contributions of additional funds below.

Across the ten years, only seven countries contributed climate finance in addition to the 0.7% of GNI they provide as ODA: Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, the

New and additional climate finance (Per capita annual average; 2011-2020; USD)		
Country	Strongly additional: Additional to 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA	Weakly additional: Additional to the level of development finance in 2009
Luxembourg	\$170	\$121
Norway	\$143	\$98
Sweden	\$63	\$59
Denmark	\$30	\$8
Netherlands	\$5	\$0
Germany	\$2	\$65
United Kingdom	\$1	\$30
Switzerland	\$0	\$36
Iceland	\$0	\$28
Austria	\$0	\$15
Japan	\$0	\$12
New Zealand	\$0	\$10
Canada	\$0	\$10
Italy	\$0	\$10
Australia	\$0	\$9
Finland	\$0	\$8
France	\$0	\$7
United States	\$0	\$6
Spain	\$0	\$1
Belgium	\$0	\$1
Portugal	\$0	\$1
Greece	\$0	\$0
Ireland	\$0	\$0
<b>Annex II Parties</b>	<b>\$2</b>	<b>\$15</b>

**Table 3:** The relative efforts of Annex II Parties to provide new and additional climate finance in the context of two definitions of additionality: (1) Funds in excess of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA; and (2) Funds in excess of the level of development finance in 2009 (USD; 2011-2020; Per capita annual averages). Ordering presents the countries providing finance above 0.7% of GNI first, and then those providing climate finance above the levels of development finance observed in 2009.

Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Three smaller contributors of climate finance, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden provided the most strongly additional climate finance per capita.

Concerning absolute amounts, **Table 4** compares the climate finance reported by each country from 2011 to 2020, and the amounts which can be considered to be new and additional under the two assessed definitions.

20 countries provided some weakly additional climate finance in excess of the level of development finance they disbursed in 2009, with only the Netherlands, Greece, and Ireland failing to do so. However, only five countries provided 90% or more of their self-reported climate finance totals as weakly additional finance, namely Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

The members of the Group of Seven (G7), Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United

Country	Reported climate finance	Strongly additional: Additional to 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA	Weakly additional: Additional to the level of development finance in 2009
Norway	\$8.0 bn	\$7.4 bn (93.00%)	\$5.0 bn (62.90%)
Sweden	\$6.3 bn	\$6.3 bn (99.70%)	\$5.8 bn (92.70%)
Germany	\$63.2 bn	\$1.9 bn (3.10%)	\$53.9 bn (85.30%)
Denmark	\$3.0 bn	\$1.7 bn (56.40%)	\$0.4 bn (14.20%)
Luxembourg	\$1.0 bn	\$1.0 bn (100%)	\$0.7 bn (72.70%)
United Kingdom	\$19.9 bn	\$1.0 bn (4.90%)	\$19.9 bn (100%)
Netherlands	\$6.2 bn	\$0.8 bn (12.60%)	\$0
United States	\$20.4 bn	\$0	\$17.8 bn (87.20%)
Japan	\$88.6 bn	\$0	\$14.8 bn (16.70%)
Italy	\$6.3 bn	\$0	\$5.9 bn (93.40%)
Canada	\$4.2 bn	\$0	\$3.7 bn (88.50%)
Switzerland	\$3.0 bn	\$0	\$3.0 bn (100%)
Australia	\$2.3 bn	\$0	\$2.1 bn (89.20%)
France	\$47.1 bn	\$0	\$4.8 bn (10.20%)
Austria	\$2.4 bn	\$0	\$1.3 bn (55.00%)
Spain	\$7.1 bn	\$0	\$0.5 bn (6.70%)
Finland	\$1.5 bn	\$0	\$0.4 bn (29.70%)
New Zealand	\$0.5 bn	\$0	\$0.5 bn (99.80%)
Belgium	\$2.1 bn	\$0	\$0.1 bn (4.70%)
Portugal	\$0.4 bn	\$0	\$0.1 bn (18.00%)
Iceland	\$0.14 bn	\$0	\$0.10 bn (70.40%)
Greece	\$0.3 bn	\$0	\$0
Ireland	\$1.0 bn	\$0	\$0
<b>Annex II Parties</b>	<b>\$295.1 bn</b>	<b>\$20.1 bn (6.8%)</b>	<b>\$140.9 bn (47.8%)</b>

**Table 4:** Reported climate finance totals and the subsequent amounts which can be determined to be new and additional in the context of two definitions of additionality: (1) Funds in excess of 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA; and (2) Funds in excess of the level of development finance in 2009 (USD billions; 2011-2020 aggregate totals). Ordering presents the countries providing finance above 0.7% of GNI first, and then those providing climate finance above the levels of development finance observed in 2009. Percentages in parentheses represent additional finance as a share of a Party's reported climate finance.

States, represent some of the largest global economies and countries reporting large amounts of climate finance. Collectively, G7 countries account for 85% of the climate finance reported by all rich countries from 2011 to 2020. Japan, Germany, France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada are responsible for 30%, 21%, 16%, 7%, 7%, 2%, and 1% of the \$295 billion of climate finance reported across the ten-year period, respectively.

Despite reporting such large quantities of finance, these large economies provide very little strongly additional climate finance, having largely failed to provide 0.7% of their GNI as ODA. Only Germany and the United Kingdom provided any funds on top of their GNI-ODA pledge, contributing, on average, \$2 and \$1 per capita annually, respectively. G7 countries contributed just 14% of the \$20 billion of strongly additional finance. In contrast, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, and Sweden, accounting for 3% of Annex II Parties' collective GNI, provided 82% of the \$20 billion total.

Concerning weakly additional finance, G7 countries contributed 86% of the \$141 billion total, with Germany and the United Kingdom providing the most on a per capita basis.

# HOW MUCH NEW AND ADDITIONAL CLIMATE FINANCE DOES EACH COUNTRY PROVIDE?



CARE has compiled the climate finance reported by Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020, using the UN's BR-DI (UNFCCC, n.d). Figures covering 2021 and 2022 will be published in 2024. The data represents the most up to date figures officially reported to the UNFCCC, and allows the finance reported by individual countries to be assessed in the context of their contributions of development finance.

Development finance, GNI, and population statistics are sourced from the OECD (OECD, n.d a). Development finance totals represent net disbursements of both ODA and OOF, provided through both bilateral and multilateral channels.

The following 'factsheets' presented in this chapter contain information on reported and new and additional climate finances being provided by each country, allowing for detailed assessment of their respective efforts.

**Each factsheet contains four figures: A, B, C, and D.** Alongside the climate finance reported by each country to the UNFCCC, figures include an estimate of the imputed climate-relevant share of each country's core contributions to multilateral organisations, and, where relevant, their share of EU climate finance.

**Figure A** presents the total amount of climate finance reported by each country across the ten years, alongside the total amounts found to be weakly and strongly additional. Where a country has reported more climate finance in a given year than the observed increase in total development finance relative to 2009, weakly additional finance totals represented by yellow columns will decrease compared to reported climate finance totals presented in orange columns. Regarding strongly additional finance, in any given year, if a country has not surpassed the 0.7% GNI-ODA target by an amount which is larger than the climate finance they reported, then new and additional totals represented by dark blue columns will decrease relative to reported totals. In the best-case scenario, three annual columns of equal value indicate that all of the climate finance reported by a country has been found to be both strongly and weakly new and additional.

**Figure B** presents the same three totals as in Figure A, yet annually from 2011 to 2020.

**Figure C** presents weakly additional climate finance in excess of the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. The extent of any increase in a given year's development finance total, relative to 2009, sets the annual upper bound for weakly additional climate finance. The

figure is schematic and does not include to-scale depictions of total development finance totals from 2011 to 2020, due to its simultaneous presentation of both new and additional ODA and OOF.

**Figure D** presents strongly additional climate finance in excess of the 0.7% of GNI pledged as ODA annually. Figures are provided as a percentage of total GNI. Each country's reported climate finance totals include only the most equitable finance and exclude any non-ODA amounts. Only climate finance provided on top of the 0.7% GNI-ODA pledge can be considered as new and additional finance.

# AUSTRALIA



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Australia was the 15<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 20<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Australia was the 16<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 13<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Australia provided \$2.338 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing no significantly increasing trend. Of this \$2.338 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Australia failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Australia's annual contributions of ODA fell from 2012-2020.
- 89.2%, or \$2.085 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that Australia has contributed most of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, Australia provided less new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Australia restated its pledge to increase its climate finance contributions to AUD 2 billion across 2021-2025,

including AUD 700 million for renewable energy and disaster risk reduction in the Pacific (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Australia provided 0.22% and 0.19% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	99.6%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	0.4%
Concessional grant share:	99.5%
Non-grant share:	0.5%
Adaptation share:	21.2%
Mitigation share:	10.3%
Cross-cutting share:	68.5%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# AUSTRIA



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Austria was the 14<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 12<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Austria was the 16<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 14<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Austria provided \$2.445 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend. Of this \$2.445 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Austria failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Austria's annual contributions of ODA increased towards 2016 yet decreased thereafter.
- 55%, or \$1.345 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, Austria has not consistently increased its annual development finance totals enough for all the country's climate finance contributions to be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Austria provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Austria did not provide clear information indicating that the country will significantly enhance the level and

predictability of its future climate finance (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Austria provided 0.31% and 0.39% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	69.6%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	30.4%
Concessional grant share:	63.4%
Non-grant share:	36.6%
Adaptation share:	6.3%
Mitigation share:	48.7%
Cross-cutting share:	45.0%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# BELGIUM



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Belgium was the 16<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 15<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Belgium was the 15<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 10<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Belgium provided \$2.103 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend. Of this \$2.103 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Belgium failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Belgium's annual contributions of ODA were higher in 2011 than in 2020 and show a slightly decreasing trend between those years.
- 5%, or \$98 million, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. Relative to 2009, Belgium has largely failed to increase its annual development finance totals, meaning only a small portion of the country's climate finance contributions can be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Belgium provided less new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

UNFCCC, Belgium pledged to contribute EUR 135 million of climate finance annually, from 2022 (UNFCCC, 2023). The pledge would represent an increase in the country's climate finance contributions. The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Belgium provided 0.43% and 0.45% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	98.2%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	1.8%
Concessional grant share:	96.7%
Non-grant share:	3.3%
Adaptation share:	37.7%
Mitigation share:	10.4%
Cross-cutting share:	51.9%

In its second biennial communication submission to the

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# CANADA



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Canada was the 11<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 17<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Canada was the 8<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 16<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Canada provided \$4.228 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend from 2015-2020. Of this \$4.228 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Canada failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Canada's annual contributions of ODA were higher in 2011 than in 2020 and show a slightly decreasing trend between those years.
- 89%, or \$3.742 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that Canada has contributed most of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, Canada provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communications to the UNFCCC, Canada restated its pledge to double its five-year climate

finance contribution to CAD 5.3 billion for 2021-2025 (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Canada provided 0.32% and 0.37% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	96.1%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	3.9%
Concessional grant share:	63.1%
Non-grant share:	36.9%
Adaptation share:	17.2%
Mitigation share:	22.5%
Cross-cutting share:	60.3%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# DENMARK



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Denmark was the 12<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 7<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Denmark was the 14<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 4<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Denmark contributed \$3.046 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend. Of the \$3.046 billion, CARE finds:

- 56%, or \$1.719 billion, was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA. Denmark surpassed the 0.7% target in all years, yet insufficiently so in 2016-2020 for all reported climate finance to be considered additional. As a share of GNI, Denmark's annual contributions of ODA fell from 2011-2020.
- 14%, or \$0.432 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. Relative to 2009, Denmark has largely failed to increase its annual development finance totals, meaning only a small portion of the country's climate finance contributions can be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Denmark provided less new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

UNFCCC, Denmark restated its commitment to increase its climate finance contributions by providing 25% of the country's annual direct assistance to developing countries as grant-based climate finance from 2023 onwards (approximately DKK 4 billion per year) (UNFCCC, 2023). At least 60% of the country's public grant-based climate finance will be in support of adaptation objectives (ibid.). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Denmark provided 0.71% and 0.67% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d.a; Udvikling, 2023).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	99.0%
Non-grant share:	1.0%
Adaptation share:	20.6%
Mitigation share:	29.7%
Cross-cutting share:	49.7%

In its second biennial communication submission to the

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# FINLAND



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Finland was the 17<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 13<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Finland was the 17<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 9<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Finland provided \$1.482 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing a slight increasing trend. Of the \$1.482 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Finland failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Finland's annual contributions of ODA showed a decreasing trend from 2011-2020.
- 30%, or \$0.440 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, Finland has not consistently increased its annual development finance totals enough for all the country's climate finance contributions to be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Finland provided less new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In the country's second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Finland pledged to increase its climate

finance contributions to "above or around" EUR 200 million annually from 2022-2026 (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Finland provided 0.47% and 0.58% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	78.7%
Non-grant share:	21.3%
Adaptation share:	9.6%
Mitigation share:	21.4%
Cross-cutting share:	68.9%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# FRANCE



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, France was the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 4<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, France was the 4<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 12<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that France provided \$47.117 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with reported totals showing an increasing trend. Of the \$47.117 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with France failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, France's annual contributions of ODA remained close to 0.4% of GNI from 2011-2019 yet rose significantly in 2020.
- 10%, or \$4.807 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. Relative to 2009, France has largely failed to increase its annual development finance totals, meaning only a small portion of the country's climate finance contributions can be considered as new and additional.
- On average, France provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, France restated its pledge to contribute EUR 6 billion

of climate finance annually post-2020, with 30% dedicated towards adaptation (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

France provided 0.51% and 0.56% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	81.9%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	18.10%
Concessional grant share:	15.1%
Non-grant share:	84.9%
Adaptation share:	19.4%
Mitigation share:	64.9%
Cross-cutting share:	15.7%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# GERMANY



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Germany was the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Germany was the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 8<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Germany provided \$63.175 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with reported totals increasing sharply between 2014 and 2015 and maintained thereafter. Of the \$63.175 billion, CARE finds:

- 3%, or \$1.949 billion, was strongly additional and provided in excess of the 0.7% of GNI pledged as ODA. Germany surpassed the UN 0.7% target in 2020 only, yet insufficiently so for all that year's climate finance to be considered additional. As a share of GNI, Germany's annual contributions of ODA show an increasing trend from 2011-2020.
- 85%, or \$53.898 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that Germany has contributed most of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009. On average, Germany provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Germany restated its commitment to increase the climate finance it provides from budgetary sources from

EUR 4 to EUR 6 billion by 2025 at the latest (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Germany provided 0.76% and 0.83% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	93.1%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	6.90%
Concessional grant share:	52.2%
Non-grant share:	47.8%
Adaptation share:	20.0%
Mitigation share:	56.8%
Cross-cutting share:	23.2%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# GREECE



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Greece was the 22<sup>nd</sup> largest provider of climate finance in absolute terms from 2011-2020, and the smallest per capita. As a provider of development finance, Greece was the 22<sup>nd</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the smallest per capita.

CARE estimates that Greece provided \$291 million of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing a weakly increasing trend across the period. Of the \$291 million, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Greece failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Greece's annual contributions of ODA showed an increasing trend from 2011-2020.
- None was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed by Greece in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, Greece has failed to increase its annual development finance totals from 2011-2020.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Greece provided little information to better ensure the predictability of its future climate finance for developing countries, or to evidence it would increase (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Greece provided 0.16% and 0.14% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	100.0%
Non-grant share:	-
Adaptation share:	4.7%
Mitigation share:	59.3%
Cross-cutting share:	36.0%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# ICELAND



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Iceland was the smallest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 8<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Iceland was the smallest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 15<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Iceland provided \$136 million of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend from 2011-2018 and a decreasing trend thereafter. Of this \$136 million, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Iceland failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, annual contributions of ODA showed a slightly increasing trend from 2011-2020.
- 70%, or \$96 million, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, Iceland has not consistently increased its annual development finance totals enough for all the country's climate finance contributions to be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Iceland provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

Iceland has not presented a climate finance target in its biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC to

outline its future climate finance plans (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (ibid.).

Iceland provided 0.28% and 0.34% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	96.5%
Non-grant share:	3.50%
Adaptation share:	37.2%
Mitigation share:	18.4%
Cross-cutting share:	44.4%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# IRELAND



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Ireland was the 18<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 14<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Ireland was the 18<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 11<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Ireland provided 0.31% and 0.64% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	97.9%
Non-grant share:	2.10%
Adaptation share:	52.1%
Mitigation share:	1.9%
Cross-cutting share:	45.9%

CARE estimates that Ireland provided \$1.008 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals increasing from 2014-2020. Of the \$1.008 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Ireland failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, annual contributions of ODA decreased from 2011-2020.
- None was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed by Ireland in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, Ireland has failed to increase its annual development finance totals from 2011-2020.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Ireland restated its pledge to increase its annual climate finance contributions to EUR 225 million by 2025 (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# ITALY



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Italy was the 8<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 19<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance Italy was the 10<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 20<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Italy provided \$6.282 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend. Of this \$6.282 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Italy failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, annual contributions of ODA increased from 2012-2017, yet generally decreased thereafter.
- 93%, or \$5.866 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that Italy has contributed most of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, Italy provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In 2021, Italy pledged to increase its contribution of climate financial to \$1.4 billion annually up to 2025 (COP26 Presidency, 2021b). While Italy's second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC included pledges of finance to be made through specific channels, it did not restate the

\$1.4 billion target (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Italy provided 0.29% and 0.32% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

### Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	98.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	2.0%
Concessional grant share:	90.0%
Non-grant share:	10.0%
Adaptation share:	13.4%
Mitigation share:	10.3%
Cross-cutting share:	76.4%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# JAPAN



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Japan was the largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 5<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Japan was the 5<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 19<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Japan provided \$88.6 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals generally showing an increasing trend from 2011-2018 then decreasing from 2018-2020. Of this \$88.6 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Japan failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Japan's annual contributions of ODA showed no significant trend across the period.
- 17%, or \$14.8 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. Relative to 2009, Japan has largely failed to increase its annual development finance totals, meaning only a small portion of the country's climate finance contributions can be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Japan provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Japan committed to provide approximately \$71

billion USD of public and private climate finance from 2021-2025 (\$14.2 billion annually) (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Japan provided 0.34% and 0.39% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	70.8%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	29.2%
Concessional grant share:	14.4%
Non-grant share:	85.6%
Adaptation share:	14.5%
Mitigation share:	76.1%
Cross-cutting share:	9.4%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# LUXEMBOURG



Luxembourg is one of the few countries who ensure the finance they report to the UNFCCC is additional to their support for development. Alongside provisions of climate finance from within its ODA budget, Luxembourg provides International Climate Finance (ICF) from a budget which is independent and on top of its development support.

Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Luxembourg was the 19<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Luxembourg was the 21<sup>st</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Luxembourg provided \$1.0 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing a generally increasing trend from 2011-2019 and a significant decrease in 2020. Of the \$1.0 billion, CARE finds:

- All was strongly additional and provided in excess of the 0.7% of GNI pledged as ODA. As a share of GNI, Luxembourg's annual contributions of ODA remained at around 1% from 2011-2020. Luxembourg surpassed the 0.7% target in all years.
- 73%, or \$727 million, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, Luxembourg has not consistently increased its annual development finance totals enough for all the country's climate finance contributions to be considered as new and additional.

→ On average, Luxembourg provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission, Luxembourg pledged to provide EUR 220 million of new and additional climate ODA from 2021-2025, an increase from the EUR 200 million pledged in its 2020 biennial communication submission (UNFCCC 2023).

Luxembourg provided 0.99% and 1.00% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	42.1%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	57.9%
Concessional grant share:	77.3%
Non-grant share:	22.7%
Adaptation share:	25.3%
Mitigation share:	11.6%
Cross-cutting share:	63.0%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# THE NETHERLANDS



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, the Netherlands was the 10<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 9<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, the Netherlands was the 7<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 6<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that the Netherlands provided \$6.2 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend. Of the \$6.2 billion, CARE finds:

- 13%, or \$776 million, was strongly additional and provided in excess of the 0.7% of GNI pledged as ODA. The Netherlands surpassed the 0.7% target in 2011, 2012 and 2015, yet insufficiently so in 2012 and 2015 for all that year's climate finance to be considered additional.
- None was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed by the Netherlands in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, the Netherlands failed to increase its annual development finance totals from 2011-2020.
- The Netherlands provided no new and additional climate finance in the post-Paris Agreement period.

Although the Netherlands firmly committed to provide new and additional climate finance in 2009, in 2010 it decided to decrease its ODA spending gradually from 0.8% GNI to 0.7% in 2012. Moreover, it was decided that the costs of international climate finance would be an integral part of this budget. Ever since, Dutch cabinets have not reaffirmed a commitment to provide 0.7% of GNI as ODA, resulting in

shares of 0.52% and 0.67% in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, the Netherlands committed to increase its public and private climate finance to EUR 1.8 billion by 2025 (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a renewed commitment to, or definition of, new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	100.0%
Non-grant share:	-
Adaptation share:	28.4%
Mitigation share:	15.3%
Cross-cutting share:	56.3%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# NEW ZEALAND



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, New Zealand was the 20<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 18<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, New Zealand was the 19<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 17<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that New Zealand provided \$494 million of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing a generally increasing trend. Of this \$494 million, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with New Zealand failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, annual contributions of ODA show no significant trend from 2011-2020.
- 99.8%, or \$493 million, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that New Zealand has contributed almost all of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, New Zealand provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

New Zealand's second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC reiterated the country's pledge of a four-fold increase in grant-based climate finance (UNFCCC,

2023). The pledge increased the country's previous biennial communication commitment to provide NZD 300 from 2022-2025, to NZD 1.3 billion over the same period (COP26 Presidency, 2021). At least 50% of the support will target developing countries in the Pacific and at least 50% will target adaptation.

New Zealand provided 0.28% and 0.23% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	99.7%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	0.3%
Concessional grant share:	93.7%
Non-grant share:	6.3%
Adaptation share:	33.0%
Mitigation share:	33.6%
Cross-cutting share:	33.4%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# NORWAY



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Norway was the 6<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Norway was the 9<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms and the largest provider per capita.

CARE estimates that Norway provided \$8.0 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing no strong trend. Of the \$8.0 billion, CARE finds:

- 93%, or \$7.4 billion, was strongly additional and provided in excess of the 0.7% of GNI pledged as ODA. As a share of GNI, Norway's annual contributions of ODA remained above 0.9% across all years, rising to above 1.0% in multiple years. However, the country reported 7% of its climate finance as non-concessional OOF across the period, while only concessional funds can be considered as new and additional under this definition.
- 63%, or \$5.0 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that, relative to 2009, Norway has not consistently increased its annual development finance totals enough for all the country's climate finance contributions to be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Norway provided less new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

the UNFCCC reiterated the country's pledge to double its annual climate finance contributions from NOK 7 billion in 2020 to NOK 14 billion (approximately \$1.7 billion) by 2026 at the latest (UNFCCC, 2023). This figure includes both public climate finance and mobilized private climate finance.

Norway provided 0.93% and 0.86% of their GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022 (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	93.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	7.0%
Concessional grant share:	93.0%
Non-grant share:	7.0%
Adaptation share:	4.4%
Mitigation share:	38.3%
Cross-cutting share:	57.3%

Norway's second biennial communication submission to

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# PORTUGAL



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Portugal was the 21<sup>st</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 22<sup>nd</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Portugal was the 20<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 22<sup>nd</sup> largest per capita.

The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Portugal provided 0.18% and 0.23% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

CARE estimates that Portugal provided \$417 million of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing no strong trend. Of the \$417 million, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Portugal failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Portugal's annual contributions of ODA fell from 2011-2020.
- 18%, or \$75 million, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. Relative to 2009, Portugal has largely failed to increase its annual development finance totals, meaning only a small portion of the country's climate finance contributions can be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Portugal provided less new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	85.4%
Non-grant share:	14.6%
Adaptation share:	6.3%
Mitigation share:	62.9%
Cross-cutting share:	30.8%

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Portugal reiterated its pledge to double its climate finance to EUR 35 million, by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2023).

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020



Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# SPAIN



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Spain was the 7<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 16<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Spain was the 13<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 21<sup>st</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Spain provided \$7.1 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend across the period. Of the \$7.1 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Spain failing to meet the target in all years. As a share of GNI, Spain's annual contributions of ODA showed no significant trend from 2011-2020.
- 7%, or \$480 million, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. Relative to 2009, Spain has largely failed to increase its annual development finance totals, meaning only a small portion of the country's climate finance contributions can be considered as new and additional.
- On average, Spain provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC, Spain reaffirmed its pledge to provide up to EUR 1.35

billion EUR (approximately \$1.5 billion) of climate finance annually by 2025, a 50% increase from the EUR 900 million pledged to provided by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Spain provided 0.26% and 0.30% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	49.9%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	50.1%
Concessional grant share:	42.4%
Non-grant share:	57.6%
Adaptation share:	6.9%
Mitigation share:	68.8%
Cross-cutting share:	24.4%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# SWEDEN



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Sweden was the 9<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 6<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Sweden was the 6<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Sweden provided \$6.279 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals decreasing from 2011-2014 and increasing thereafter. Of the \$6.279 billion, CARE finds:

- 99.7%, or \$6.261 billion, was strongly additional and provided in excess of the 0.7% of GNI pledged as ODA. As a share of GNI, Sweden's annual contributions of ODA as a share of GNI remained above 0.9% across the period and surpassed 1.0% in seven of the ten years assessed. From 2011-2020, Sweden provided 0.3% of its climate finance as non-concessional OOF, which cannot be considered as new and additional under this definition.
- 93%, or \$5.819 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that Sweden has contributed most of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, Sweden provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

Sweden's second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC included a reference to the previous government's intention to double its annual public climate finance to developing countries to SEK 15 billion by 2025 (UNFCCC, 2023). In its 2023 budget, the Swedish government removed its target to provide 1% of the country's GNI as ODA annually, pledging to provide SEK 56 billion of ODA annually from 2023-2025 (approximately 0.88% of projected GNI) (Donor Tracker, 2023).

Sweden provided 0.91% and 0.90% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	99.7%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	0.3%
Concessional grant share:	99.7%
Non-grant share:	0.3%
Adaptation share:	31.5%
Mitigation share:	15.0%
Cross-cutting share:	53.5%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020

Reported climate finance    Climate finance additional to the level of development finance disbursed in 2009    Climate finance additional to 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA



Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# SWITZERLAND



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, Switzerland was the 13<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 10<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, Switzerland was the 12<sup>th</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 5<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that Switzerland provided \$3.0 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing an increasing trend. Of the \$3.0 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with Switzerland failing to meet the target in all years.<sup>1</sup> As a share of GNI, Switzerland's annual contributions of ODA show no significant trend from 2011-2020.
- All climate finance was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that Switzerland has contributed all of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, Switzerland provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

Switzerland's second biennial communication submission to the UNFCCC reiterated the country's pledge to increase

<sup>1</sup> Switzerland is one of the few developed countries not to formally commit to providing 0.7% of GNI as ODA annually.

public climate finance to CHF 400 million annually by 2024 (approximately \$426 million) (UNFCCC, 2023). The submission did not restate the pledge made by Switzerland at COP26, to further increase that pledge to CHF 425 million annually by 2025 (approximately \$453 million) (COP26 Presidency, 2021b). The submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

Switzerland provided 0.50% and 0.56% of their GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	99.8%
Non-grant share:	0.2%
Adaptation share:	36.6%
Mitigation share:	27.7%
Cross-cutting share:	35.7%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020




Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# THE UNITED KINGDOM



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, the United Kingdom was the 5<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 11<sup>th</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, the United Kingdom was the 3<sup>rd</sup> largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 7<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that the United Kingdom provided \$19.9 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals generally showing an increasing trend. Of the \$19.9 billion, CARE finds:

- 5%, or \$969 million, was strongly additional and provided in excess of the 0.7% of GNI pledged as ODA. The United Kingdom met the 0.7% target from 2013-2020, yet insufficiently so for a substantial portion of reported climate finance to be considered additional. As a share of GNI, the United Kingdom's annual contributions of ODA increased from 2012-2013 and remained relatively constant thereafter.
- All climate finance was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that the United Kingdom has contributed all of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, the United Kingdom provided more new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the

UNFCCC, the United Kingdom reiterated its pledge to double its five-year climate finance commitment from GBP 5.8 billion to GBP 11.6 billion over the period 2021/22-2025/26 (UNFCCC, 2023). The UK's second biennial communication submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

From 2021, the United Kingdom cut its annual ODA budget from 0.7% to 0.5% of GNI - providing 0.50% and 0.51% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (UK Parliament, 2020; OECD, n.d a). Because the UK has significantly cut its ODA spend, and chosen to count other expenditure, such as in donor country refugee costs, towards this reduced budget, these decisions have greatly reduced the UK Government's spending on international development since 2020 and potential to meet climate finance commitments.

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	100.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	-
Concessional grant share:	87.3%
Non-grant share:	12.7%
Adaptation share:	22.5%
Mitigation share:	26.6%
Cross-cutting share:	50.9%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020



Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI



# THE UNITED STATES



Of the 23 Annex II Parties, the United States was the 4<sup>th</sup> largest provider of climate finance from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and the 21<sup>st</sup> largest provider per capita. As a provider of development finance, the United States was the largest provider of ODA and OOF from 2011-2020 in absolute terms, and 18<sup>th</sup> largest per capita.

CARE estimates that the United States provided \$20.4 billion of climate finance across the ten years, with annual totals showing no significant trend. Of the \$20.4 billion, CARE finds:

- None was strongly additional and provided in excess of the UN target to contribute 0.7% of GNI as ODA, with the United States failing to meet the target in all years.<sup>1</sup> As a share of GNI, the United States' annual contributions of ODA decreased from 2011-2020.
- 87%, or \$17.8 billion, was weakly additional and provided above the level of development finance disbursed in 2009. This means that the United States has contributed most of its climate finance in the context of increasing annual development finance totals, relative to 2009.
- On average, the United States provided slightly less new and additional climate finance annually after the Paris Agreement than before.

In its second biennial communication submission to the

<sup>1</sup> The United States is one of the few developed countries not to formally commit to providing 0.7% of GNI as ODA annually.

UNFCCC, the United States reiterated its pledge to increase its public climate finance to developing countries by 2024 to around \$11.4 billion annually (UNFCCC, 2023). Despite this, the US Congress struggled to approve significant amounts of climate finance in 2022 and 2023 (Thwaites, Schmidt, and Guy, 2022). The United States' second biennial communication submission did not include a definition of new and additional climate finance in line with the content and spirit of commitments made under the UNFCCC (CARE, 2023).

The United States provided 0.20% and 0.22% of its GNI as ODA in 2021 and 2022, respectively (OECD, n.d a).

## Characteristics of climate finance reported to the UNFCCC from 2011 to 2020

Concessional share (ODA):	82.0%
Non-concessional share (OOF):	18.0%
Concessional grant share:	82.0%
Non-grant share:	18.0%
Adaptation share:	17.5%
Mitigation share:	57.5%
Cross-cutting share:	25.0%

Figure A: Additionality of climate finance: 2011-2020

Reported climate finance Climate finance additional to the level of development finance disbursed in 2009 Climate finance additional to 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA



Figure B: Additionality of annual climate finance

Reported climate finance Climate finance additional to the level of development finance disbursed in 2009 Climate finance additional to 0.7% of GNI provided as ODA




Figure C: Weakly additional finance in excess of development finance provided in 2009

Development finance Level of development finance disbursed in 2009 Non-additional climate finance New and additional climate finance





Figure D: Annual ODA contributions and amounts of strongly additional finance in excess of 0.7% of GNI

Non-Climate ODA 0.7% of GNI Non-additional climate finance



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# ANNEX A: ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON OUR DATA AND CALCULATIONS

As outlined in the methodology section, to analyse the additionality of reported climate finance CARE has compiled wealthy countries' first, second, third, fourth and fifth biennial reports (BRs) to the UNFCCC using the Biennial Reports Data Interface (BR-DI) (UNFCCC, n.d). These reports allow for an analysis of the public climate finance reported from 2011 to 2020 and represent all the data officially reported to the UNFCCC to date (climate finance totals for 2010 were not reported to the UNFCCC).

This Annex outlines the quality assurance undertaken by CARE to ensure the comparability and accuracy of produced climate finance figures, alongside the additional data processing undertaken to capture the full financial effort of wealthy countries to contribute climate finance.

## Tracking climate finance and accounting for inconsistency

CARE has tracked climate finance from 2011 to 2020 using the data reported by wealthy countries themselves to the UNFCCC. However, there are well-documented inconsistencies and inaccuracies included in this reporting (Bos and Thwaites, 2021). For each Annex II Party, reported

data has been quality assured to ensure better consistency between annual totals.

The principal adjustments made to the data reported by wealthy countries to the UNFCCC account for: the inconsistent use of exchange rates and financial units; non-granular, or generalised, reporting; errors regarding number formats produced by the BR-DI's processing of small financial values; and the simultaneous reporting of both commitments and disbursements to the same activity.

Regarding "non-granular", or "generalised", reporting, it is commonplace for Parties to provide aggregate information regarding their finances. For example, Parties can commonly report finance with both an ODA and OOF component, yet without providing a breakdown of the proportions of each.

Where generalised reporting has been found, CARE has used a 50:50 approach. For example, a financial contribution reported as both ODA and OOF has been treated as 50% ODA, and 50% OOF.

The annual totals produced by CARE have themselves been quality assured and are in close agreement with those published by the UN in Biennial Assessment reports

(UNFCCC, 2014; 2016b; 2018b; 2021; 2022). CARE's calculation of the total amount of climate-specific finance contributed by wealthy countries from 2011 to 2020 is within 0.1% of the total published in the UN's Biennial Assessment reports.

## Accounting for core contributions to multilateral organisations

Parties use a variety of methods to process their core contributions to multilateral organisations.

Core contributions represent finance provided by a country which enters the general budget of a recipient multilateral organisation. As such, a core contribution cannot be said to explicitly support climate objectives.

Most Parties report a portion of their core contributions as climate finance using the OECD's imputed multilateral contributions method, while others note that the methodology is imperfect and avoid using it. The OECD method relies on a set of percentages which represent the share of climate finance within a given multilateral organisation's total financial outflows to developing countries. These coefficients can be multiplied with a wealthy country's core contribution to multilateral organisations to estimate flows of climate finance (OECD, 2018).

A significant amount of the public climate finance which is attributable to each wealthy country originates from its core support to multilaterals, including the multilateral development banks (MDBs). Currently, the OECD's method is one of the few available and accessible ways to estimate the climate-relevant share of core contributions.

To capture as much of each country's financial effort as possible, CARE has calculated the share of each Party's core contributions to multilateral organisations which can be classified as climate finance and included it in their totals. The OECD's imputed multilateral contributions method has been used where Parties have not made use of it, or another method, already. Annex B contains a summary of each Party's treatment of core contributions from 2011 to 2020.

The OECD has published imputed multilateral shares for a selection of multilateral organisations, covering the finances contributed to those organisations from 2013 to 2020 (OECD, n.d.). For core contributions provided in 2011 and 2012, CARE has estimated and applied an imputed multilateral share

that considers all available data for each organisation.

## Attributing the EU's public climate finance to Member States

The funds extended by the European Union through the European Development Fund and European Commission are directly attributable to the public budgets of EU Member States. As a result, the climate finance provided by the Commission and Development Fund from 2011 to 2020 can be distributed between those Member States.

CARE has attributed the finance reported by the EU in its biennial report submissions to individual member states using their respective contributions to the EU budget (European Commission, n.d.). Again, this is to capture as much of each country's financial effort as possible.

## Comparison with the OECD's estimate of provided and mobilised climate finance

In 2020 the OECD reported that developed countries had provided and mobilised a total of \$83.3 billion of climate finance. Of this total, \$13.1 billion was private finance which was mobilised by wealthy countries, while a further \$1.9 billion was provided as export credits. This leaves an estimated \$68.3 billion of public climate finance being provided by developed to developing countries (OECD, 2022).

Taking 2020 as an example again, CARE's analysis assessed the \$38 billion of public climate finance provided to developing countries, as reported by Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC. The figures and analyses therefore differ in a number of ways. Firstly, this analysis considers the efforts made by countries with obligations under the UNFCCC to provide public climate finance, rather than the efforts of all developed countries. Secondly, only the finance which is most strongly attributable to the public budgets in wealthy Annex II countries is considered here. It is these financial efforts which are the most suitable for an assessment of additionality under the UNFCCC, and for comparison with efforts to provide public support for development.

For example, the \$14.6 billion of mobilised private finance estimated by the OECD is not sourced directly from public

budgets, only mobilised by them. Contributors of climate finance can report the public finance used to mobilise private funds in their reporting to the UNFCCC, meaning that these financial efforts can be captured in this analysis. Furthermore, because mobilised private finance is likely to be provided alongside conditions commonly found on private markets, it is difficult to consider the finance as developmental, or as support to aid the implementation of the UNFCCC. Because of these issues, mobilised private finance is seen to be unsuited for comparisons with public support for development in an assessment of additionality.<sup>1</sup>

Separate to the issue of mobilised private finance, OECD reports include a large amount of climate finance channelled through multilateral organisations. This is, in part, because outflows of climate finance from a multilateral organisation to a recipient country in the global South can be larger than the public finance originally channelled to them, as reported to the UNFCCC.

Multilateral organisations can generate and reinvest revenue while leveraging finance on private markets. In effect, they have a large capacity to create their own resources. Because multilateral organisations overwhelmingly utilise loans to provide their climate finance, and because loans stretch those provisions by recycling repayments into other climate-relevant activities, it is questionable whether such finance can be considered as “new” in nature. This means that a portion of multilateral outflows are also unsuitable to be compared against public development support under the present analysis’ conceptualisation of additionality.

Ultimately, by making attempts to capture the total effort made by each Annex II country, and by considering only officially reported public climate finance, the present analysis critically assesses the financial effort of individual wealthy countries to provide public climate finance on top of their public support for development.

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<sup>1</sup> The Center for Global Development considered climate finance mobilised from private sources to be new and additional (Mitchell, Ritchie and Tahmasebi, 2021). They argued that prior to the \$100 billion goal being agreed, little private finance was being mobilised by wealthy countries to support climate action in the global South. For this reason, the finance was seen as additional to the level of development support provided prior to the Copenhagen Accord.

# ANNEX B: TREATMENT OF CORE CONTRIBUTIONS IN REPORTING

Parties use a variety of methods to process their core contributions to multilateral organisations. Core contributions represent finance provided by a country which enters the general budget of a recipient multilateral organisation. Such finance cannot be said to explicitly support climate objectives. Some Parties report a portion of this core finance as climate finance using the OECD’s imputed multilateral contributions methodology. Others note that the OECD’s methodology is imperfect and avoid using it. This Annex contains CARE’s assessment of how each country has treated their core contributions when reporting climate finance figures to the UNFCCC.

## Treatment of core/general contributions in biennial reporting

## BR1 (data covering 2011-2012)

## BR2 (data covering 2013-2014)

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions methodology, reporting it in the climate-specific column (alongside the full amount in the core column).

Finland, Netherlands

Australia<sup>\*\*\*</sup>, Finland, France, Netherlands

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method, reporting it in the climate-specific column (with no, or an adjusted value, included in the core contributions column).

Austria, Italy, Switzerland

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method and reporting it in the core column (with no value included in the climate-specific column).

Canada

Parties not calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method, instead reporting full core contributions to multilaterals in the core column. °

Australia\*, Austria\*, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US

Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK, US

Parties who did not supply any data regarding core contributions or did not specify how it is treated.

Belgium, EU, Luxembourg

EU

## Treatment of core/general contributions in biennial reporting

## BR3 (data covering 2015-2016)

## BR4 (data covering 2017-2018)

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method, reporting it in the climate-specific column (alongside the full amount in the core column).

Australia, Finland, France, Switzerland

Australia, Finland, France,  
Sweden, Switzerland

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method, reporting it in the climate-specific column (with no, or an adjusted value, included in the core contributions column).

Austria, Italy\*\*, Netherlands,  
Spain

Austria, Italy\*\*, Netherlands,  
Spain

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method and reporting it in the core column (with no value included in the climate-specific column).

Canada, Norway

Canada, Norway

Parties who do not calculate the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method and instead report full core contributions to multilaterals in the core column. °

Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland,  
Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand,  
Portugal, Sweden, UK, US

Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland,  
Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand,  
Portugal, UK, US

Parties who did not supply any data regarding core contributions or did not specify how it is treated.

EU

EU, Greece

## Treatment of core/general contributions in biennial reporting

## BR5 (data covering 2019-2020)

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method, reporting it in the climate-specific column (alongside the full amount in the core column).

Australia, Finland, France<sup>b,e</sup>, **Germany, Greece, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal**,  
Sweden, Switzerland

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method, reporting it in the climate-specific column (with no, or an adjusted value, included in the core contributions column).

Austria, Italy, Netherlands, **Spain, Canada**

Parties calculating the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method and reporting it in the core column (with no value included in the climate-specific column).

Norway

Parties who do not calculate the climate-specific share of their core/general contributions using the imputed multilateral contributions method and instead report full core contributions to multilaterals in the core column. <sup>o</sup>

Belgium, Denmark, **EU**, Iceland, Luxembourg,  
UK, US

Parties who did not supply any data regarding core contributions or did not specify how it is treated.

*Red text shows a change in the methodology used to process core contributions when compared to the Party's prior Biennial Report submission.*

*<sup>o</sup> In this category, some Parties may have included finance relating to climate change funds in the climate-specific column, yet imputed multilateral contributions have not been calculated for the multilateral development banks.*

*\* In this biennial report, the Party did not supply clear methodological information regarding the treatment of its core contributions and other treatments that are possible. This classification represents an informed decision regarding the methodology used.*

*\*\* In its BR2 submission, Italy did not provide clear methodological information regarding the treatment of its core contributions. It is assumed that they were reported as they were in later BR3 and BR4 submissions. In BR3, BR4, and BR5 submissions, Italy calculated imputed multilateral contributions where possible, reporting the climate-specific share in the climate-specific column, and the difference between the full core contribution and the imputed climate-specific share in the core column.*

*\*\*\*Australia calculated imputed multilateral contributions for core contributions to multilateral development banks in 2014, but not for 2013.*

#### **IMAGE CREDITS**

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